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Abstract: The idea of changing our energy system from a hierarchical design into a
set of nearly independent microgrids becomes feasible with the availability of small
renewable energy generators. The smart microgrid concept comes with several chal-
lenges in research and engineering targeting load balancing, pricing, consumer inte-
gration and home automation. In this paper we first provide an overview on these
challenges and present approaches that target the problems identified. While there ex-
ist promising algorithms for the particular field, we see a missing integration which
specifically targets smart microgrids. Therefore, we propose an architecture that inte-
grates the presented approaches and defines interfaces between the identified compo-
nents such as generators, storage, smart and “dumb” devices.
1 Introduction
The trend towards distributed renewable energy production leads to new challenges. Re-
newable energy sources typically rely on the weather and thus lead to variable energy
production which is hard to manage. However, they are an important part of future smart
grids and therefore there are a lot of efforts to make these sources more efficient. Future
smart grids will not only have to integrate distributed renewable energy sources, but will
also have to integrate information and communication technologies (ICT) for management
and control [Far10]. Currently, ICT integration is done by installing smart meters, which
opens a wide area of new applications.
Future efforts target the increase of manageability and efficiency by dividing the smart
grid into sub-systems [MP11]. Such sub-systems are called smart microgrids and consist
of energy consumers and producers at a small scale and are able to manage themselves.
Examples for smart microgrids are households, villages, industry sites, or a university
campus. A smart microgrid can either be connected to the backbone grid, to other mi-
crogrids or it can run in a so called island mode. Dynamic islanding is one of the main
solutions to overcome faults and voltage sags [Las11]. According to Mohn and Piasecky
in [MP11] smart microgrids need to be controlled on two levels, (1) analog-centric control
for power stability and (2) digital-centric control for system automation. We are specifi-
cally interested in the second level, which is responsible for calculating the need for energy
based on its price, reliability, and current system state.
In more detail we will give an overview on dynamic pricing, Smart Home automation
in combination with Demand Response (DR) and power load balancing in island mode.
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These topics target improved reliability, better management of distributed resources, and
higher power efficiency, but are typically isolated research efforts. We want to subsume
these topics and strive to give an outlook on a holistic approach of smart microgrids.
2 Dynamic Pricing
Currently there are only a small number of market trader companies that manage the en-
ergy market, but with the envisioned network of smart microgrids a high number of com-
ponents emerge that are influencing each other. This will lead to new business models and
dynamic market models. Since it is possible to integrate multiple consumers and interme-
diate traders at the intersections of several microgrids, agent-based solutions emerge. An
agent can be represented by a meter, a control entity, market entity, aggregation entities,
etc. [DD11]. All of these agents are capable of communicating with each other and based
on that make decisions. On the market level agents can buy and sell energy and negotiate
prices. In the following we discuss two of the current approaches for price agreement -
market-based approaches and game theoretic considerations.
2.1 Market-based approaches
Market-based approaches are efficient in dealing with different kinds of decentralized trad-
ing systems [Cle96], e.g., the stock market. Advantages of market-based approaches are
the local view of the agents and there is no need to publish their bids and asks before clear-
ance. We concentrate on published market based mechanisms for energy pricing, where
also small producers are considered, i.e., small photovoltaic entities, or wind generators
on household, but also in shared cases such as a campus or an industry site. The market
mechanism consists of day-ahead pricing and real-time pricing mechanisms and in some
nations this market is even open for individual consumers.
We found several implementations of market-based approaches and strive to give an overview
by categorizing them based on the following criteria.
• Producers (level of detail): shared energy producers, homes
• Supports island mode: yes, no
• Auction protocol
• Capacity feedback loop: yes, no
• Goal of the approach
One of the well known implementations of simulating pricing in the energy market is
called AMES [LST08]. In this system the authors consider a combination of pricing with
capacity and rely on Locational Marginal Prices (LMP). For each node in the network, ei-
ther producing or consuming energy, a separate price is calculated a day ahead of the actual
consumption/production based on hourly reports. A consumer can have a fixed demand
that is not price-sensitive and a dynamic demand that is price-sensitive, the same applies
for the producers. The system consists of an independent system operator (ISO) that col-
lects bids and offers from each buyer and seller a day ahead. Each hour the ISO reports the
commitments based on the LMPs for the next day, allowing to adjust the dynamic demands
and offers of the buyers and sellers. The authors compare different ratios of price-sensitive
demands, the impact of price caps and generator learning capabilities (strategic behavior).
The generator learning behavior has a high impact on the price a consumer has to pay.
Even with price caps, the model might lead to significantly higher prices. The work relies
on shared energy producers and central entities. It is not mentioned if islanding is sup-
ported. However, if we consider small microgrids, each of it needs a central entity that
collects bids and offers also considering imbalances for renewable energy generators. The
communication relies on the knowledge and reliable connection of all nodes within the
network. The pricing is dependent on the capacity of a generator, however, this work does
not consider congestion on selected power links.
An extension to AMES can be found in [VRV10]. The authors argue that in the work of
Li et al [LST08] the learning mechanisms of generators lead to unfair market conditions
for the consumers and reduce the efficiency of the system. In this work, the authors use
Continuous Double Auction (CDA), which is successfully applied in the stock market.
Sellers and buyers can place their bids continuously during a fixed trading period. If a
match between buyers and sellers is found, the auction is performed immediately. An
interesting point is that the mechanism leads to price adaptations in case of congestion.
The proposed mechanism consists of three parts: (1) the Trading Mechanism controls
agents’ interactions, (2) the Security Mechanism controls the transmission line capacities,
(3) the Online Balancing Mechanism ensures fair pricing for extra demand and supply. The
balancing mechanism manages the extra demand and supply based on secure quantities
instead of price, i. e., often leads to losses for bad predictions in the day ahead market. The
authors evaluate their mechanism by applying different agent behavior strategies, namely
(1) zero-intelligence, (2) AA-strategy with an extension to electricity markets, i. e., AA-
EM. Zero-intelligence draws a random number between 0 and the limit price for offers and
bids. The AA-EM strategy considers a weighted average of transaction prices within one
node to calculate the equilibrium price. In a fully connected network and even in the small
world network the system efficiency goes up to 95 %. To support islanding the mechanism
relies on a trader agent and network control agent in each microgrid. The authors further
assume reliable connection links for communication. The mechanism considers explicitly
sellers and buyers on the same node, i. e., this mechanism can be applied on household
level.
Ramachandran et al. describe in [RSEC11] a CDA based auction model that considers
islanding of microgrids (extends [DH05]). The goal is to maximize the consumption from
the local distributed energy resources without selling energy to the global grid. If the
load demand exceeds the generation rate, energy is bought from the global grid. For the
optimization method the authors propose to use bio-inspired algorithms and compare dif-
ferent implementations based on artificial immune systems. In artificial immune systems
antigens are invaders that should be attacked by matching antibodies built as an immune-
response. The first method called AIS [DV99] evaluates the antibodies according to their
affinity (cost). A number of antibodies is called a generation and the next generation
evolves by evaluating the affinity values of each antibody. Depending on the goodness
of an antibody either a copy, a mutation or a new generated antibody is selected for the
next generation. The input of the immune system is the price and the number of antibod-
ies (i.e., distributed energy resources). The authors argue that this method is inefficient
because of redundant searches for the optimum and propose an improvement operator in-
spired by particle swarm intelligence (called IPSO). Instead of cloning the best candidates
the authors propose to improve their affinity instantly. Each of the candidates is seen as a
particle in the swarm and as such can have a velocity and a position. The goal is to calcu-
late the velocity and position of that particle for the next stage. The better the position in
the next stage the more likely is the cloning of this candidate. This approach shows price
reductions of up to 37 % in using DERs efficiently in comparison to only using the global
grid.
Although not applied to energy markets the authors of [DHKT01] show interesting re-
sults when comparing the performance (gains of trading) of software agents with human
traders in a laboratory auction based on CDA. In the energy market the number of agents
(seller/buyers) is large, which makes the system complex. In this experiment the number of
agents is limited to 12 and even in this case the software agents lead to a better performance
than the human counterparts. The agent behavior follows a modified zero-intelligence-plus
algorithm where period lengths and persistent open orders are considered. The authors
compare ZI-plus with the Gjerstad and Dickhaut (GD) [GD98] algorithm, which is based
on historical trades and calculates a belief value. The original implementation leads to a
high fluctuation of bids and asks with a high variance in the prices. Both of the methods,
however, would have to be changed to be applied to the energy market (i.e., considering
link capacities and congestion). A central auctioneer is considered that manages all bids
and asks.
In Duan and Deconinck [DD10] traditional auction-based methods are compared accord-
ing to the number of messages that have to be exchanged. The authors further compare the
increase of messages to be exchanged if the number of agents increases. The main con-
tribution is an architecture and communication protocol for smart microgrids that allow
for implementing different auction based methods. The basic market procedure consists
of three phases (1) initial price, (2) bid & adjust and (3) demand function. The auction
methods are English auction, First-price sealed-bid, Dutch auction and Vickrey auction
[San99]. In the English auction the bidders raise their prices until none of the bidders
raises anymore. The opposite mechanism is the Dutch auction, where the bidders lower
their prices until one of the bidders takes the good. In the First-price sealed-bid auction
each bidder provides an uninformed bid and the highest bid wins. The Vickrey auction
works similar, but the price the winner has to pay is the second-highest bid. The basic as-
sumption of all of these methods is that there is one seller and a number of bidders. In the
energy market, this setting might apply for one of the microgrids, but even there several
power generators might act as sellers. Further, the authors do not consider the question on
Table 1: Comparison of Market-based Approaches for Microgrids, Energy source - S:shared,
H:home, Island mode - +:yes, -:no, o:depends, auction protocol, capacity feedback +:yes, -:no, and
goal
Source Island Auction Capacity F. Goal
[LST08] S o LMP - market efficiency
[VRV10] H o CDA + market and DER efficiency
[RSEC11] H + CDA + DER efficiency
[DHKT01] S - CDA - market efficiency
[DD10] S + traditional - communication efficiency
how the different microgrids should interact with each other.
Since these approaches have different goals and applications we compare them according
to the categories identified above. We classify the approaches by producer types, i.e. if the
households are producers themselves or if the energy source is shared, by the capability
of supporting island mode, by the type of the auction protocol and if the energy capacity
is considered. Finally, we state the goal of the approach. In table 1 we subsume the
discussion of the before mentioned approaches.
2.2 Game-theoretic approaches
Game-theoretic approaches are a promising tool for the analysis of smart grid systems.
There are numerous applications, especially in the form of non-cooperative games and
learning algorithms. Non-cooperative games can be used to implement demand-side man-
agement or for deployment and control of microgrids [SHPB12].
The applicable game theoretic methods range from classical non-cooperative Nash games
to advanced dynamic games. For an application of game-theoretic methods in energy sys-
tems the following aspects have to be considered: First, the assumption that all players
are perfectly rational might not hold. Decisions of real players in the smart grid scenario
might deviate from the most rational solution due to failure, delay in learning, influence by
other players, or a global information source. For example, if all neighbors are getting a
photovoltaic power source, a house owner might be inclined to do so as well, with probable
less regard of the pay-off expectation. A good advertising campaign for a certain product
might also influence the player’s decisions in a non-rational way. Second, people might
intentionally try to break the system – either in order to increase their own revenue or just
to cheat. Consider a smart microgrid network where a particular connection forms a distri-
bution bottleneck during a short period of the day. Normally, market forces will overcome
this bottleneck as good as possible, however, a “cheating” player might deliberately block
the access in order to create a supply shortfall with prices favorable for the player. Or,
market players would deliberately place unrealistic bids in order to generate oscillations in
the system. Therefore, game-theoretic models and algorithms for smart microgrids are re-
quired to be robust against perturbations such as the impact of (deliberately or accidently)
non-rational decisions. Fortunately, there exist methods such as the trembling hand equi-
librium or strong time consistency that address these problems [You04, Bas95, Fud98].
A use case for game theory is auction theory [ABBB04] in order to negotiate on the price
and amount of energy to be exchanged between networked microgrids. An introduction to
possible auction models for smart micro-grids has been given earlier in this paper. Another
application of game theory would be to view the possibly cooperating smart micro-grids as
players in a cooperative game. Several micro-grids can decide to form a coalition network
that locally exchanges energy. Each micro-grid would try to optimize its payoff, which is a
function of energy cost, energy loss due to transmission or over-production and fulfilment
of energy needs of their customers. Apart from the static initial cost for networking the
micro-grids, there would be a dynamic since with each new formation or modification of
a coalition, the individual payoffs would change.
3 Consumer Integration and Home Automation
One of the hardest challenges of power systems is to balance demand and supply of energy.
The advent of new energy consuming appliances such as electric vehicles make this task
even harder. The goal is therefore to make consumers responsive by applying so called De-
mand Response (DR) mechanisms. Consumers should change their behavior in response
to the market, by reducing usage during peak periods, by shifting their demand to off-peak
periods or by using own generation facilities (e.g., photovoltaic systems). Different strate-
gies can be implemented to encourage clients to actively participate, either by dynamic
pricing, automatic load control or by incentive payments. In either way, the consumers
need to be able to use their appliances without restrictions [AES08]. The interaction be-
tween consumer and grid will be enabled by smart meters, sensors, digital controls and
analytical tools [JF11]. The decisions are often supported by automatic predictions or
automatic schedules for home appliances and energy resources (home automation). In
comparison to the before mentioned price models the following works consider consumer
response in a feedback loop.
Demand Response can be used to forecast future demands of consumers, e.g., by tracking
the consumption, weather, etc. over a long time period and then learning from these pat-
terns for similar days [LMF10]. The authors consider for their future work also to integrate
real-time client feedback, however, argue that the learning mechanism can become very
complicated.
Most works combine home automation and demand response to increase the benefit for
the consumers. In [MPC09] the authors define that appliances are competing agents for
hot water and energy. The goal is to avoid energy peaks (that could lead to outages) by au-
tomatically managing the appliances. One of the important points is that the consumers’s
actions are prioritized, e.g., if the consumer takes a shower and needs hot water, the dish-
washer (if not heating water automatically) has to compete with the shower. During this
time the dishwasher might be delayed, but the shower cannot. Based on these assumptions
the authors use genetic algorithms. A set of parameters are considered as members of a
chromosome. A number of chromosomes are regarded as population and by evaluating
the chromosomes according to their predefined fitness, the next population is generated
via reproduction, crossover and mutation. In comparison to traditional optimization the
genetic algorithm is a heuristic approach that needs a number of generations to lead to
good results. The authors claim that the design of the genetic algorithm has a high impact
on its performance. The work shows promising results, however, the scope of action for a
client had been severely restricted to reduce the search space.
In [NHDH08] home-automation is made explicitly interactive. The proposed system rec-
ommends how a consumer can instantly save energy or costs. The authors call the system
Model Predictive Control (MPC). MPC considers different control steps executed period-
ically (e.g., every 15 minutes). At these control steps the current system state is measured
and based on that the optimization problem solved. The outcome is a number of possi-
ble actions to improve the system’s performance, so called “predictions” (of the energy
savings).
A similar system is described by Pedrasa et al. in [PSM10]. The authors automatically
manage the home appliances by using particle swarm optimization (see section 2). In this
case particle swarms are operation schedules for the appliances, including the charging of
an electric vehicle. For each appliance a number of swarms exist. However, best results
are achieved if the schedules of the appliances are coordinated instead of considering them
isolated. In this approach not only the energy consumption is optimized, but also the costs
are reduced. The system targets to use battery stored power during high-price periods and
to avoid photovoltaic energy export.
Client feedback should be as simple as possible, thus, there are solutions that let the client
configure energy consumption tasks to occur during specific time periods. E.g., the dish
washer should run between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Lightning and fridge have fixed consump-
tion times that should not change. The task optimization is part of the home automation
mechanism, such as introduced by [ZP11], [JF11]. Such a mechanism ensures that clients
keep the control of their appliances and therefore the acceptance increases. Nonetheless,
the prices might not be optimal in comparison to the full automatic scheduling.
In the following table 2 we subsume the described approaches. We categorize the ap-
proaches by their (1) goal, i.e., prediction or feedback, (2) the optimization mechanism
used and the (3) integration of the consumers. Fully automated solutions are considered
passive, interactive solutions are considered as active user feedback.
4 Load Balancing in Island Mode
Operating in island mode is typically either motivated by high costs to access the grid
or by the absence of a connection to the grid. In the latter case the disconnection is
caused either by failure or to enable maintenance of the main grid without supply in-
terruption. Some projects also employ intentional islanding to increase system reliabil-
ity [KAT08, LANF10]. Load balancing in microgrids comes with several challenges:
Table 2: Comparison of home automation and consumer interaction, Optimization mechanims: pre-
diction (pred.), feedback (fb.), mixed integer linear programming (milp), User Feedback: active (a),
passive (p)
Goal Optimization Mechanism User Feedback
[LMF10] pred./fb. - p
[MPC09] fb. genetic algorithm p
[NHDH08] pred. milp a
[PSM10] pred./fb. particle swarm optimization p
[ZP11],[JF11] pred./fb. milp a
While main distribution grids are typically significantly over-dimensioned regarding both
their transmission capacity and their energy production flexibility, this is not the case
for most microgrids. Load changes, for example, can be relatively large with respect
to total load. This small scale of an islanded microgrid sets physical implications to load
changes [VRD+11]. Another challenge is the limited flexibility in energy generation. Al-
ternative energy sources allow the spatial distribution of the energy production, but their
output depends on environmental conditions (solar, wind). This makes it difficult to apply
a load-following strategy, since the reserves on energy production are limit. Therefore, a
smart microgrid will have to employ a load control strategy, which includes load shedding.
In order to adjust to the time-of-day dependent energy generation performance, a demand
dispatch strategy is motivated. To apply this kind of load control, a significant amount
of the appliances must be “smart” [EE12] in the way that they support load shedding or
dispatching of their operating time.
Thus, we can identify the following methods for load balancing.
Generator power control: Assuming that the power generation of a smart microgrid can-
not be controlled smoothly and fast enough in order to stabilize the microgrid volt-
age, droop control strategies are employed in order to keep the voltage within an
acceptable band without changing the generation power[VRD+11]. Droop is the
intentional loss in output voltage from a device as it drives a load by employing a
series resistor between the regulator output and the load. Thus, the output voltage is
less affected by load changes. Whenever the microgrid voltage exceeds its defined
tolerance band, the generated power is adapted.
Demand dispatch: Demand dispatch is a cooperative method to shift the energy con-
sumption to a later point in time. Therefore, cooperation between smart devices and
the microgrid power control is necessary. Demand dispatch has been implemented
before in the form of different energy tariffs for different times of the day, whereof
the nighttime tariff was the most popular one. With the limited ability to handle
peak load in microgrids, demand dispatch becomes more and more important. Can-
didates for demand dispatch are dishwashers, washers and dryers, electric hot water
heaters, HVAC systems with thermal storage, defrost cycles of refrigerators, battery,
plug-in vehicles [LRSW10]. Lu et al. estimated that 33% of all loads could have
at least some level of demand dispatch control without a significant impact on end
users [LRSW10]. For a microgrid the time scale of the load control can be very
demanding, ranging from hours to even sub-seconds.
Load shed: In case the load is exceeding the maximum generation power of the micro-
grid (or, the generation of additional power would not be economically feasible), a
smart microgrid has to shed some load in order to keep the stability of the microgrid
voltage. Load shed can be done by turning off devices or by reducing their power
consumption, e.g., by operating them at a lower level of service. An example could
be the heating of water, which, if taken back only a few degrees can safe significant
amounts of energy at the cost of user’s convenience. For turning off devices, a pri-
oritization of devices has to be done based on the potentially reduced energy and
their contribution to the overall level of service for the user. The problem of select-
ing the optimal set of devices for reducing a given amount of power consumption
is equivalent to the Knapsack problem, which, when needed to be solved exactly, is
NP-complete [MT90].
Storage: With a storage unit, energy can be stored during times when production exceeds
consumption. At times when consumption exceeds production, the storage can pro-
vide the missing demand. Thus, without the cooperation of devices or restricting
the user the actual demand on energy generation can be shifted. However, with
current technologies, storage mechanisms for microgrids are expensive, especially
when based on battery technology. Other storage approaches like pumped-storage
hydroelectricity provide higher capacity and lower cost per energy unit, but do not
scale down to the needs of a typical microgrid. Plug-in hybrid or electric cars might
provide feasible energy storage for balancing smart grids without extra cost.
These approaches are not exclusive but can be integrated for microgrid stabilization in
island mode as depicted in Figure 1. The different controllers forming a chain of supply
and demand need to be tuned well in order to avoid instabilities such as a bullwhip effect
in the power control.
Figure 1: Load balancing methods
5 Conclusion and Outlook
We gave an overview on the main topics as shown in Figure 2. The research efforts we
subsumed are, except demand response and home automation, isolated. In demand re-
sponse the authors often consider pricing as incentive for consumers to actively response
to their energy consumption, however, the price and auction models already implemented
by other researchers are not considered. The same applies for load balancing. Initiatives
such as the E-Energy projects in Germany1 and the smart cities projects in Austria2 show
the necessity of integrating these efforts to holistic architectures.
In the subsumed research topics of the above sections we have seen that many parts of a
smart microgrid can be modeled as an optimization problem. Whenever the problem gets
too complex, traditional methods or evolutionary algorithms are applied. On this basis we
discuss possibilities of integrating these approaches to a whole architecture (see Figure 3).
We have seen that for dynamic pricing the continuous double auction (CDA) principle is
most common, but with different adaptations. The adaptations consider the optimization
of either the market or a combination of load and market stability. To integrate the current
load of the system an interface is needed to the consumers (DR-layer), because they might
react due to the changing prices. Additionally, the energy load mechanisms need to be
considered. The optimization on the level of the dynamic pricing layer of the architecture
might get too complex and thus might need too long to be efficiently applied in a real
system. Furthermore, full automated systems might not be accepted by the consumers, be-
cause they have no impact on how the system reacts. In Figure 33 we pinpoint interactions
between different actors of a smart microgrid. In islanded mode the microgrid has to rely
on renewable energy sources, an emergency power generator and a storage facility (e.g.,
a battery). It consists of a number of devices, that are either ”smart” or ”dumb”. Smart
devices can be scheduled because of user interactions or implicit demands. It has to be
considered that smart devices can be dependent on each other. The incentive mechanism
is the price-based energy market. One can see that the interface to the high-voltage grid
also interfaces the market. A microgrid consists of a buyers and sellers, whereas each of
the energy sources can be a seller. The power generator collects information from devices
and consumer feedback and performs auction based methods such as CDA. Since we as-
sume that investments into power generation have been already done, we use the marginal
costs to define the feasibility of using a particular generation unit. In the case of renewable
energy sources, the available energy often comes with practical no marginal cost (indi-
1http://www.e-energy.de/en/
2http://www.smartcities.at/
3Image references: David Castillo Dominici, Pixomar, dan, Sura Nualpradid / FreeDigitalPhotos.net
Figure 2: Current Research Efforts towards Smart Microgrids
Figure 3: Outlook on networked smart microgrids
cated by “$ = 0” in the figure). In contrast, a diesel generator defines its marginal cost by
the amount of fuel consumed during operation. For the consumer side, it is necessary to
define a level of service and a relation of the level of service to some cost model. The opti-
mization mechanism should maximize the consumer’s level of service and use information
on load, price, congestion, current renewable energy sources and the battery. Maximizing
level of service could mean that a consumer can consume energy instantly when needed
and the rest of the appliances are scheduled according to (1) network load and (2) energy
price. Given that some appliances only provide a level of service in combination with other
appliances (for example powering a computer monitor only makes sense if the computer
is also running), this optimization is typically a complex task. Since decisions are created
at different time scales and levels of criticality, there is a need for a structured and efficient
energy optimization. Another open question, which we are planning to target in future
work, is the communication between microgrids, e.g., for exchanging distributed energy
resources.
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